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abstract:	suppose	a	fire	broke	out	in	a	fertility	clinic.	One	had	
time	to	save	either	a	young	girl,	or	a	tray	of	ten	human	embryos.	
Would	it	be	wrong	to	save	the	girl?	according	to	Michael	sandel,	
the	moral	intuition	is	to	save	the	girl;	what	is	more,	one	ought	to	
do	so,	and	this	demonstrates	that	human	embryos	do	not	possess	
full	personhood,	and	hence	deserve	only	limited	respect	and	may	
be	killed	for	medical	research.	We	will	argue,	however,	that	no	
relevant	 ethical	 implications	 can	be	drawn	 from	 the	 thought	
experiment.	it	demonstrates	neither	that	one	always	ought	to	let	
the	embryos	die,	nor	does	it	allow	for	any	general	conclusion	
concerning	the	moral	status	of	human	embryos.
1. a thouGht experiment
hilosophical	thought	experiments	hardly	ever	make	it	into	a	greater	public	
arena.	Most	of	them	are	quite	obscure,	and	only	very	few	are	of	broader	interest.	
However,	in	spring	2001	there	was	a	heated	and	public	discussion	in	germany	about	
such	a	though	experiment	after	reinhard	Merkel,	a	professor	of	legal	studies	at	the	
University	of	Hamburg,	had	introduced	it	to	a	wider	audience	in	the	high-circula-
tion	weekly	Die Zeit	(Merkel,	2001).	Only	a	few	readers,	though,	realized	that	the	
thought	experiment	actually	goes	back	to	an	article	published	in	the	Hastings Center 
Report by	george	annas	who	in	turn	took	up	a	suggestion	by	leonard	glantz:	
“if	a	fire	broke	out	in	the	laboratory	where	these	seven	embryos	are	stored,	and	
a	two-month-old	child	was	in	one	corner	of	the	laboratory,	the	seven	embryos	in	
another,	and	you	could	only	save	either	the	embryos	or	the	child,	i	doubt	you	would	
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have	any	hesitancy	in	saving	the	infant”	(annas,	1989,	p.	22).	recently,	Michael	
sandel	(2003)	has	reformulated	this	thought	experiment:	“suppose	a	fire	broke	
out	in	a	fertility	clinic.	You	had	time	to	save	either	a	five	year	old	girl,	or	a	tray	of	
ten	embryos.	Would	it	be	wrong	to	save	the	girl?”	(pp.	9–10).1	as	Merkel	points	
out	in	his	version	of	this	thought	experiment,	one	should	assume	that	the	child	is	
already	unconscious	to	block	any	distorting	considerations	about	the	baby	feeling	
pain	etc.	also,	Merkel	is	right	in	saying	that	the	number	of	embryos	is	irrelevant;	so	
it	could	be	seven,	seven	hundred	or	seven	thousand,	it	does	not	matter.	it	does	not	
matter	because	according	to	annas,	Merkel,	sandel,	et	al.,	the	normative	conclu-
sion	would	always	be	the	same:	“saving	the	infant,	however,	acknowledges	that	the	
child	is	not	equated	with	the	embryo”	(annas,	1989,	p.	22).	similarly,	sandel	uses	
the	thought	experiment	to	argue	against	a	view	he	calls	the	“‘equal	moral	status’	
view,”	i.e.,	“to	attribute	full	personhood	to	the	embryo”	(p.	9).
since	annas	makes	little	of	the	thought	experiment,	and	because	Merkel’s	posi-
tion	is	not	known	beyond	germany,	we	will	concentrate	on	sandel’s	version	of	the	
thought	experiment	which	actually	puts	it	in	the	context	of	considerations	about	
the	moral	status	of	human	embryos.2	sandel’s	position	is	all	the	more	interesting	
since	he	is	a	member	of	the	President’s	Council	on	bioethics.	in	this	council,	the	
thought	experiment	was	used	as	an	argument	against	 the	position	that	embryos	
must	not	be	used	for	stem	cell	research.
We	will	argue,	first,	that	sandel	has	not	made	up	his	mind	about	the	episte-
mological	 status	 of	 his	 thought	 experiment,	 and	 that,	 second,	nothing	morally	
relevant	follows	from	this	thought	experiment;	despite	its	initial	plausibility,	no	
valid	moral	conclusion	can	be	drawn	from	it.	note	that	the	purpose	of	this	article	
is	not	to	demonstrate	directly	what	the	moral	status	of	human	embryos	actually	is,	
and	it	will	also	not	discuss	the	numerous	ethical,	epistemological,	and	ontological	
problems	that	arise	in	the	debate	about	the	moral	status	of	human	enbryos.3	this	
paper	is	limited	in	scope;	it	is	primarily	critical.
2. the epistemic role of the thouGht experiment
sandel	begins	with	the	claim	that	there	“are	three	possible	ways	of	conceiv-
ing	the	moral	status	of	the	embryo—as	a	thing,	as	a	person,	or	as	something	in	
between”	(9).	it	is	not	entirely	clear	what	he	means	by	‘something	in	between.’	in	
any	event,	he	seems	to	hold	that	the	human	embryo	is	not	merely	a	thing,	and	even	
if	it	were,	one	could	not	conclude	that	it	did	not	deserve	any	respect.	For	person-
hood,	sandel	argues—quite	correctly,	we	think—is	not	a	necessary	condition	for	
something	to	deserve	(at	least	some)	respect.	However,	he	attacks	the	view	which	
he	calls	the	‘equal	moral	status’	view.	according	to	this	position,	embryos	have	to	
be	attributed	“full	personhood”	(p.	9).	What	that	(‘full	personhood’)	really	means	
also	is	not	clear.	but	it	is	sandel’s	strategy	to	play	out	the	“full	implications”	(p.	
9)	of	this	view	and	then	to	show	by	applying	a	kind	of	reductio ad absurdum—we	
call	it	later	an	ethical modus tollens—that	this	view	is	untenable.	thus,	he	attempts	
to	demonstrate	that	if	embryos	had	full	personhood,	we	needed	to	save	those	ten	
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embryos	rather	than	the	child,	but	that	actually	we	must	not	save	the	embryos	which	
is	why	it	cannot	be	true	that	embryos	have	full	personhood.4
let	us	now	have	a	closer	look	at	the	thought	experiment.	We	are	to	suppose	that	
a	fire	broke	out	in	a	fertility	clinic	and	that	we	only	had	time	to	save	either	a	five	
year	old	girl,	or	a	tray	of	ten	embryos.	the	question	then	is:	Would	it	be	wrong	to	
save	the	girl?	Clearly,	sandel	suggests	that	not	only	would	it	not	be	wrong	to	save	
the	girl,	but	rather	it	would	be	wrong	to	save	the	embryos	and	let	the	child	die.	this	
might	be	true	or	false,	but	the	first	question	is:	What	epistemic	role	does	this	thought	
experiment	have?	is	sandel	saying	that	we	gain	ethical	insight	about	the	question	
whether	embryos	have	‘full	personhood’	by	thinking	about	the	thought	experiment	
inasmuch	as	it	elicits	some	kind	of	moral intuition	such	that	we	just	know	(see)	that	
saving	the	embryos	would	be	wrong	and	hence	know	that	embryos	are	not	persons?	
Or	is	the	thought	experiment	just	an	illustration	of	an	ethical	insight	that	is	grounded	
in	 some	non-intuitive	argument?	since	sandel	does	not	provide	a	non-intuitive	
argument	one	has	to	assume	that	in	some	sense	the	thought	experiment	itself	is	the	
argument.	but	that	in	turns	means	that	sandel	bases	his	conclusion	that	embryos	
do	not	have	full	personhood	and,	a fortiori,	his	claim	that	they	may	be	killed	for	
medical	research,	on	a	moral	intuition.	there	is,	we	agree	(though	we	cannot	show	
this	here),	nothing	wrong	with	relying	on	moral	intuitions	simply	because	we	have	
to.	but	one	should	methodologically	be	clear	about	this,	and	sandel	is	not.
sandel	bases	his	conclusion	on	a	moral	intuition	because	he	really	avails	himself	
of	what	might	be	called	an	ethical modus tollens.	by	this	we	mean	arguments	of	
the	following	form:
1.	 if	some	ethical	theory	x is	true,	the	action	y is	obligatory.
2.	 action	y is	not	obligatory.
therefore,	
3.	 ethical	theory	x is	not	true.
Of	course,	this	argument-form	is	valid.	but	it	is	also	obvious	that	the	soundness	
of	actual	arguments	that	are	based	upon	this	argument-form	depends	on	the	truth-
claim	in	the	second	premise.5	the	thing	is	that	the	truth	of	this	premise	is	taken	
for	granted,	i.e.,	taken	as	intuitively true.	it	is	just	assumed	as	(self-)evident	that	
some	actions	are	obligatory,	prohibited,	or	permissible.	but	this	assumption	itself,	
the	 truth	of	 the	second	premise	 itself	 (i.e.,	 the	 truth	of	a	basic	moral	or	ethical	
proposition),	is	taken	for	granted.
Here	is	sandel’s	ethical	modus	tollens:
1.	 if	the	embryo	has	full	personhood,	it	is	obligatory	to	save	ten	embryos	rather	
than	a	child	if	a	fire	broke	out	in	a	fertility	clinic	and	we	had	only	time	to	
save	either	the	embryos	or	the	child.
2.	 but	it	is	not	obligatory	to	save	the	embryos.
therefore,	
3.	 the	embryo	does	not	have	full	personhood.
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sandel’s	two	other	arguments	run	just	like	that:
1.	 if	the	embryo	has	full	personhood,	we	have	to	punish	harvesting	stem	cells	
as	severe	as	we	punish	any	murder	of	born	humans.
2.	 but	we	ought	not	punish	harvesting	stem	cells	so	severely.
therefore,	
3.	the	embryo	does	not	have	full	personhood.
and	then	again:
1.	 if	 the	 embryo	has	 full	 personhood,	we	must	 regard	 the	natural	 death	of	
embryos	due	to	miscarriage	as	morally	equivalent	to	infant	mortality.
2.	 but	we	ought	not	regard	the	natural	death	of	embryos	due	to	miscarriage	as	
morally	equivalent	to	infant	mortality.
therefore,	
3.	the	embryo	does	not	have	full	personhood.
We	do	not	submit	that	it	 is	improper	to	refer	to	basic	moral	intuitions.	as	a	
matter	of	fact,	we	believe	that	we	cannot	do	away	with	moral	intuitions	in	moral	
philosophy,	and	hence	not	with	the	ethical	modus	tollens	either.	the	ethical	mo-
dus	tollens	is	indeed	indispensable	and	inevitable.	ethics	has	to	start	and	to	end	
somewhere,	and	there	is	no	Münchhausen-trick	that	somehow	allowed	us	to	prove	
what	is	right	or	wrong	without	already	presupposing	that	we	have	ethical	insight.	
but	again,	one	needs	to	be	clear	what	this	means	and	implies,	and	at	least	in	his	
paper	sandel	does	not	elaborate	his	understanding	of	intuitions.
3. three alternative versions of  
the thouGht experiment
How	important	it	is	to	reflect	on	the	power	and	limits	of	moral	intuitions	will	
show	if	we	reflect	upon	other	versions	of	the	thought	experiment.	in	sandel’s	thought	
experiment,	it	is	tacitly	assumed	that	we	will	always,	under	all circumstances	and	
quite	independend	of	the	context,	prefer	to	save	the	child	rather	than	the	embryos.	
but	is	this	really	true?	let	us	consider	other	versions	of	the	thought	experiment.
suppose	there	is	a	young	man	who	is,	as	far	as	he	knows,	the	last	survivor	of	a	
devastating	catastrophe;	he	is	the	last	living	member	of	the	species	homo	sapiens	
sapiens.	let	us	also	suppose	that	in	this	version	of	the	thought	experiment	the	child	
is	a	boy,	and	let	us	also	suppose	that	the	young	man	can	either	save	this	boy	or	100	
embryos.	these	embryos,	let	us	further	assume,	could	develop	into	adult	members	
of	the	species	homo	sapiens	sapiens,	namely	not	only	boys,	but	also	girls	(for	there	
are	already	artificial	uteri	and	the	young	man	could	then	raise	these	children).	if	the	
man	saves	the	child,	the	human	species	will	be	extincted;	if	he	saves	the	embryos,	
however,	there	is	a	good	chance	that	mankind	will	survive.	How	is	the	young	man	
to	decide?	We	actually	believe	that	his	duty	to	save	mankind	overrides	his	duty	to	
save	the	child	(provided	there	were	such	a	duty	at	all).6	However,	that	is	not	the	
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point.	the	point	is	that	in	such	a	case	one	has	to	admit	that	it	is,	at	least,	not self-
evident	whether	the	child	should	be	saved	rather	than	the	embryos.	this	has	two	
implications:	First,	it	is	not	intuitively	clear	that	if	one	either	can	save	a	child	or	
embryos	one	ought	to	save	the	child.	second,	it	is	clear	that	even	if	we	all	agree	
that	one	ought	to	save	the	embryos	and	hence	mankind,	this	decision,	in	and	of	
itself,	does	not	imply	that	the	moral	status	of	the	child	is	such	that	it	may	be	killed	
for	medical	research.
Or	how	about	this	version:	the	rescuer	who	rushes	into	the	fertility	clinic	is	
actually	the	biological	father	of	the	two	embryos	in	danger	to	burn;	these	embryos	
are	supposed	to	be	implanted	the	next	day	into	his	wife’s	uterus.	both	of	them	have	
long	been	looking	forward	to	this,	they	already	have	chosen	names	for	their	embryos	
and	have	established	an	emotional	contact	with	their	descendants,	and	the	embryos	
are	known	to	be	genetically	healthy.	(in	the	meanwhile,	artifical	fertilization	has	
made	such	great	progress	that	the	chance	of	these	embryos	developing	into	healthy	
fetuses	is	just	as	good	as	that	of	naturally	conceived	embryos.)	is	it	really	‘intuitively	
clear’	that	the	father	must	let	his	embryos	die	in	order	to	save	the	child?	Would	we	
all	blame	him	for	saving	the	embryos?	What	‘intuition’	do	‘we’	have?	again,	it	is	
far	from	self-evident	that	the	child	should	be	saved	rather	than	the	embryos.	and	
whatever	our	decision	might	be,	nothing	follows	from	this	regarding	the	question	
whether	embryos	may	or	may	not	be	killed	for	medical	research.
Obviously,	many	cases	and	situations	can	be	construed	as	that	what	appeared	to	
be	intuitively	clear	(the	child	is	to	be	saved,	the	embryos	must	die)	is	not	so	self-
evident,	after	all.	Here	is	another	version	worth	reflecting	upon:	let	there	be	a	tray	
of	ten	embryos	on	the	one	side	of	the	room,	but	instead	of	a	child,	let	us	assume	
there	is	(for	some	reason)	a	mortally	ill	and	unconscious	woman	on	the	other	side	
who	we	know	will	only	live	for	a	day	or	so.	so	again	we	ask:	is	it	intuitively	clear	
that	we	must	let	the	embryos	die	and	save	the	woman?
4. conclusions
so	what	follows	morally	from	the	thought	experiment?	Well,	nothing,	really.	
according	to	sandel,	our	reaction	to	the	thought	experiment	is	to	rescue	the	baby	
rather	than	the	embryos,	and	this	allegedly	proves	that	human	embryos	do	not	have	
full	personhood,	which	in	turn	justifies,	following	sandel,	the	conclusion	that	it	is	
morally	permissible	to	kill	human	embryos	for	medical	research.	First,	however,	
it	is	by	no	means	self-evident	that	we	always	really	react	to	this	thought	experi-
ment	in	the	way	sandel	suggests	(saving	the	child	and	not	the	embryos)—or	ought	
to	react,	for	that	matter.	With	regard	to	each	of	the	three	versions	of	the	thought	
experiment	we	presented,	there	is	good	intuitive	evidence	to	believe	that	most	or	
all	of	us	would	rescue	the	embryos	rather	than	the	born	human—or	ought	to,	for	
that	matter.	in	these	versions	of	the	thought	experiment	the	embryos	rather	than	
a	born	human	being	have	to	be	rescued,	and	still	no	one	would	reasonably	argue	
that	the	born	human	being	(therefore)	does	not	have	full	personhood.	it	is	only	in	
these	situations	that	embryos,	babies,	or	mortally	ill	humans	deserve	less	protection 
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because	they	are	embryos,	babies,	or	mortally	ill	human,	respectively.	nothing	can	
be	inferred	for	other	situations.	(it	is,	by	the	way,	one	thing	to	actively kill	human	
embryos	to	conduct	research	with	them,	and	quite	another	to	be	in	a	tragic	situation	
in	which	only	embryos	or	whoever	can	be	saved.)
second,	even	if	sandel’s	arguments	were	sound,	they	would	not	warrant	the	
conclusion	he	draws,	to	wit,	that	“stem	cell	research	to	cure	debilitating	disease,	
using	six	days	old	blastocysts,	cloned	or	uncloned,	is	a	noble	exercise	of	our	human	
ingenuity	to	promote	healing	and	to	play	our	part	in	repairing	the	given	world”	
(p.	 ]10).	On	sandel’s	account	 the	embryo	has	a	moral	 status	 that	 is	apparently	
not	sufficient	to	pay	it	the	amount	of	respect	that	is	sufficient	not	to	kill	it	for	the	
purposes	of	medical	research.	but	how	does	sandel	know	this?	even	if	sandel	
were	successful	in	showing	that	embryos	do	not	have	full	personhood—hence	not	
an	‘equal	moral	status’—he	still	needed	to	demonstrate	that	killing	them	for	stem	
cell	research	is	morally	permissible.	but	from	the	alleged	fact	that	embryos	do	not	
have	full	personhood	one	cannot	jump	to	the	conclusion	that	they	may	be	killed	for	
medical	research.	that	conclusion	would	only	be	valid	if	it	had	been	shown	that	
full	personhood	is	a	necessary	condition	for	a	moral	status	that	renders	protection	
from	being	killed	for	medical	research.	but	sandel	himself	denies	that	personhood	
is	such	a	necessary	condition.7	He	has	offered	no	argument,	no	criterion	by	strength	
of	which	we	would	be	able	to	determine	when	something	or	someone	does	have	
such	a	low	moral	status	that	it	might	be	killed	for	medical	research.	From	the	fact	
that	someone	or	something	is	not	a	full	person	it	simply	cannot	be	concluded	that	
he,	she,	or	it	may	be	killed	for	medical	research,	just	as	one	cannot	imply	from	the	
fact	that	someone	or	something	must	not	be	killed	for	medical	research	that	he,	she,	
or	it	is	a	full	person.	at	least	this	does	not	go	without	saying.	but	sandel	suggests	
it	does	because	this	is	the	underlying	assumption	of	his	argument.
the	crucial	question	to	answer	here	is	not	what	the	general	moral	status	of	hu-
man	embryos	is	(whatever	such	a	‘general’	status	might	be),	whether	they	are	full	
persons,	or	whether	they	have	the	same	moral	status	as	we	do.	even	if	embryos	do	
not	have	the	same	moral	status	as	we	do,	they	might	be	due	such	a	great	amount	
of	respect	that	we	must	not	kill	them	for	medical	research.	so	the	question	really	
at	stake	simply	is:	is	it	permissible	to	kill	human	embryos	in	order	to	conduct	stem	
cell	research?8
so	even	if,	in	fact,	the	thought	experiment	could	show	that	in	such	a	situation	
we	would	always	react	(or	ought	to	react)	in	the	way	suggested	by	sandel,	nothing	
could	be	inferred	from	it	with	respect	to	the	general	moral	status	of	human	embryos.	
Just	because	a	human	being	is	mortally	ill,	it	has	not	lost	its	personhood,	and	the	
fact	that	a	human	being	is	mortally	ill	does	not	give	anyone	the	right	to	exploit	it	
for	medical	reseach.	Certainly,	we	have	not	proven	here	that	embryos	possess	full	
personhood.	but	from	the	alledged	fact	that	they	rather	than	the	child	have	to	die	
in	a	burning	lab,	it	does	not	follow	that	they	do	not,	and	even	if	they	did	not,	it	
does	not	follow	that	they	may	die	for	medical	research.	let’s	bid	farewell	to	this	
kind	of	thought	experiment.
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enDnotes
1.	 Plain	numbers	in	parenthesis	refer	to	the	article	by	sandel,	2003.	
2.	 For	an	analysis	of	Merkel’s	thesis	cf.	Damschen	and	schönecker	2003b.
3.	 We	have	tried	to	show	elsewhere	(Damschen	and	schönecker	2003a)	that	killing	embryos	
for	stem	cell	research	is	morally	not	permissible.	Using	an	argument	from	potentiality,	we	
were	neither	dependent	on	a	concept	of	personhood	nor	on	a	general	definition	of	what	a	
‘moral	status’	is.
4.	 later	he	offers	two	similar	arguments	that	come	to	the	same	conclusion.
5.	 One	gets	 analogous	 argument-forms	 in	 combination	with	 deontic	 concepts	 such	 as	
“prohibited”	and	“permissible”;	hence	there	need	not	be	a	negation	in	the	second	premise.
6.	 Cf.	Jonas’s	imperative	that	“there	ought	to	be	humanity”	(Jonas,	1979,	p.	91,	our	transla-
tion).
7.	 “Personhood	is	not	the	only	warrant	for	respect”	(p.	9).	if	personhood	were	a	necessary	
condition	for	deserving	respect,	sandel	could	not	consistently	believe	that	“we	consider	it	
a	failure	of	respect	when	a	thoughtless	hiker	carves	his	initials	in	an	ancient	sequoia—not	
because	we	regard	the	sequoia	as	a	person,	but	because	we	consider	it	a	natural	wonder	
worthy	of	appreciation	and	awe”	(p.	9).
8.	 again,	it	is	not	the	purpose	of	this	paper	to	answer	this	question.	it	is	only	our	intention	
to	prove	sandel’s	argument	to	be	untenable.	
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